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Life, Liberty, and the Right to Navigate*
Justice Mosk and the Public Trust
By Jan Stevens**
Introduction
It is no surprise historically or realistically that the major waters of
a state should be impressed with a public interest so great as to preclude
public or private efforts to restrict their use. Legal systems throughout
the world have recognized that navigable waters-if not incapable of pri-
vate ownership-are subject to the paramount rights of the public.I This
principle has its roots in the law of the Romans.' As one author has
stated:
[T]here developed in the law of the Roman Empire a legal theory
known as the "doctrine of the public trust." It was founded upon
the very sensible idea that certain common properties, such as riv-
ers, the seashore and the air were held by the government in trus-
teeship for the free and unimpeded use of the general public.3
Consistent with this ancient concept, modem courts have disfavored
attempts to convey without restriction the beds and banks of navigable
waters to private parties.' Recently, however, the pressures of popula-
tion and development have led to increased efforts to "privatize" the pub-
lic waters and wetlands.5 The California Supreme Court has had
occasion to deal with such efforts in several recent cases. In a series of
* "There is no natural right of the citizen, except the personal rights of life and liberty,
which is paramount to his right to navigate freely the navigable streams of the country he
inhabits." Flanagan v. City of Philadelphia, 42 Pa. 219, 228 (1862).
** Deputy Attorney General, State of California. The views expressed herein are the
author's and do not necessarily reflect those of the Attorney General.
1. See, e.g., H. ALTHAUS, PUBLIC TRUST RIGHTS (1978). In one of the first significant
public trust opinions in the United States, the commonality of navigable waters was character-
ized as stemming from the law of nature, the civil law, and the common law of England.
Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 11-12 (1821).
2. See J. SAx, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT, 163-64 (1971).
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 171
(Mont. 1984); Mathews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 95 N.J. 306, 471 A.2d 355 (1984).
5. N. DENNIS & M. MARCUS, STATUS AND TRENDS OF CALIFORNIA WETLANDS, RE-
PORT TO CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY RESOURCES SUBCOMMITTEE ON STATUS AND TRENDS
(1984).
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four opinions written by Justice Stanley Mosk, the court has added new
vitality to the ancient public trust doctrine and ensured the continued
preservation of public rights in public waters.
The significance of these opinions is perhaps best expressed numeri-
cally: California has approximately 1,500 miles of tidal shoreline and
4,200 miles of shoreline on navigable lakes and rivers.6 While the de-
mands placed upon these resources have increased dramatically in recent
years, the total acreage available for public and private use has remained
the same, or in some areas, has been substantially reduced by filling.7
The reclamation of California's wetlands, begun in the late 1800's, has
been carried out with such efficiency that little is left of the state's ripa-
rian forests and marshes. The state's wetlands have been reduced to just
450,000 acres in 1984 from an area once ten times as large.'
The law has long recognized the need to preserve navigational wa-
ters as public highways essential for common use.9 Only recently, how-
ever, has our increased knowledge led to a recognition that wetlands,
tidelands, and the shallow shorelines are essential to water purity and
maintenance of ecological balance. Once considered wastelands worthy
only of immediate filling and reclamation, the wetlands are now recog-
nized as an important wildlife habitat and as a place of recreation and
retreat in an increasingly urbanized society. Ironically, however, these
resources are being threatened more and more by private commercial
encroachment. 10
Legal responses to the problems of water and wetland ownership
and use have varied from state to state. A few states have enacted com-
plex constitutional and statutory schemes.'1 But in most states, like Cali-
6. California Tideland Trusts, Report of the Joint Legislative Committee on Tidelands, 9
(1965).
7. The wetlands area surrounding San Francisco Bay, for example, has been reduced
from 200,000 acres to only 80,000 acres today. The reduction is caused largely by filling in an
attempt to accommodate population increase and port development. N. DENNIS & M. MAR-
CUS, supra note 5, at v.
8. Bridges & Fare, Who's Minding California's Wetlands?, 8 ENVIRONS 1 (1984); see
also N. DENNIS & M. MARCUS, supra note 5.
9. See, e.g., Silver Springs Paradise Co. v. Ray, 50 F.2d 356 (1931), cert. denied, 284 U.S.
649 (1932); Colberg, Inc. v. State ex rel. Dept. of Public Works, 67 Cal. 2d 408, 432 P.2d 3, 62
Cal. Rptr. 401 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 949 (1968); Schatz v. Guthrie, 132 N.Y.S.2d 665
(1954).
10. See N. DENNIS & M. MARCUS, supra note 5.
11. Some statutory schemes have been held by the courts to confer upon the public the
right to use water for navigational and recreational purposes. See, eg., Day v. Armstrong, 362
P.2d 137 (Wyo. 1961). Others have been held to impose public trust duties upon state govern-
ment. See, e.g., United Plainsmen Ass'n v. North Dakota State Water Conservation Comm'n,
247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976).
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fornia, statutory efforts have dealt ad hoe with only specific areas, and
the systematic development of the law has been left to the courts.12 Per-
haps the most significant common law development in California dealing
with the use and preservation of its waterways and wetlands has been the
application of the public trust doctrine.
Justice Mosk's contribution to the development of California's pub-
lic trust doctrine came in the form of four noteworthy opinions: City of
Berkeley v. Superior Court,13 State v. Superior Court (Lyon), 4 State v.
Superior Court (Fogerty),15 and City of Los Angeles v. Venice Peninsula
Properties.16 These opinions revived, reaffirmed, and clarified public
trust law. Furthermore, they supplied the foundation for the Court's
subsequent opinion holding that the exercise of water rights is subject to
public trust considerations insofar as they may affect public trust
values. 17
City of Berkeley reaffirmed the long-established California rule that
grants of tidal and submerged lands remain subject to the public trust for
commerce, navigation, and fisheries in the absence of a clearly expressed
12. In Oregon, for example, the doctrine of custom has been applied by the courts to
support public rights in all the sand beaches of that state up to the line of vegetation. See
Thornton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969). In Texas and California, the doctrine of
implied dedication has been applied to ensure public access to the navigable waters. See Gion
v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 465 P.2d 50, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1970); Briscoe & Stevens,
Gion After Seven Years: Revolution or Evolution?, 53 L.A.B.J. 207 (1977). The common law
nuisance doctrine has been applied also in California to prevent the maintenance of obstacles
in nonnavigable waters, where such obstacles have impaired navigability downstream. See
People v. Russ, 132 Cal. 102, 64 P. 111 (1901).
In recent years, the California Legislature has shown greater willingness to cope with
specific problems by enacting statutes implementing the constitutional policy to maintain free
access to navigable waters and preserve them as free highways for the people. See CAL. CONST.
art X, § 4; PuB. REs. CODE §§ 10000-10003 (West Supp. 1985) (streamflow protection stan-
dards); PUB. RES. CODE §§ 29000-29612 (West Supp. 1985) (Suisun Marsh preservation);
GOV'T CODE § 66478.5 (public access to navigable waters through subdivisions); PUB. REs.
CODE § 66801 (Tahoe Regional Planning Compact). The courts have been ready to give a
liberal construction to these statutory provisions in light of the state constitutional mandate to
do so. See, e.g., Kern River Public Access Coin. v. City of Bakersfield, 170 Cal. App. 3d 1205,
1224-25, 217 Cal. Rptr. 125, 140 (1985); People ex reL Younger v. County of El Dorado, 96
Cal. App. 3d 403, 406, 157 Cal. Rptr. 815, 817 (1979).
13. 26 Cal. 3d 515, 606 P.2d 362, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327 (1980).
14. 29 Cal. 3d 210, 625 P.2d 239, 172 Cal. Rptr. 696 (1981).
15. 29 Cal. 3d 240, 625 P.2d 256, 172 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1981).
16. 31 Cal. 3d 288, 644 P.2d 792, 182 Cal. Rptr. 599 (1982), rev'd sub nom. Summa Corp.
v. California, 466 U.S. 198 (1984).
17. National Audubon Soc'v v. Superior Ct. of Alpine County, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d
709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, cert denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983). For an excellent discussion of
Audubon and its relation to developing public trust law see Dunning, The Public Trust Doc-
trine and Western Water Law: Discord or Harmony?, Proceedings, Thirtieth Annual Rocky
Mtn. Law Inst. (1985).
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contrary legislative intent. 18 In Lyon and Fogerty, the court settled once
and for all the controversy over the application of the doctrine to non-
tidal navigable waters, such as Clear Lake and Lake Tahoe. In Venice
Peninsula Properties, the court held that the Mexican tidelands trust, ap-
plicable to California ranchos, survived annexation of California by the
United States and had not been extinguished by the issuance of federal
patents.
This Article examines these significant landmark opinions in the de-
veloping body of public trust law. Each of them, while respecting prece-
dent, shows a creative recognition of what Justice Holmes called the "felt
necessities of the times."19 They illustrate the vitality of the common law
and its efficacy in environmental preservation.
I. The Public Trust Doctrine
Basic to an understanding of the modern public trust doctrine is the
recognition that, historically, certain governmental powers have been
characterized as such an inherent part of sovereignty that they are
deemed inalienable.20 As stated long ago by the California Supreme
Court, "[t]here are certain inseparable incidents of sovereignty that must
exist wherever sovereignty itself is found. Among these is the right to
take private property for public purposes, the right of taxation, and the
right to control navigable streams. These powers are necessary to the
very existence of government."2 The American common law public
trust has its roots in this inalienability concept. That the early public
trust doctrine ensured more than the mere control of navigation, how-
ever, is illustrated by the case of Arnold v. Mundy.22 In Arnold, the New
Jersey Supreme Court stated:
[T]he navigable rivers in which the tide ebbs and flows, the ports,
the bays, the coasts of the sea, including both the water and the
land under the water, for the purpose of passing and repassing,
18. 26 Cal. 3d at 528, 606 P.2d at 369, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 335.
19. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, 1 (1881).
20. In Home Savings and Loan v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), for example, the Court
noted that "the legislature cannot bargain away the public health," in effect prohibiting the
legislature from abdicating its responsibility as guardian of public well-being. Id. at 436.
21. Biddle Boggs v. Merced Mining Co., 14 Cal. 279, 308-09 (1866). Early on, this theory
was applied to the beds of navigable waters. As one English commentator said:
What rule would be applied in case Parliament, in a moment of forgetfulness, should
undertake to grant the Thames to a private ... monopoly, is purely an academic
question. But there is no doubt that the courts would defeat an attempt on the part
of the grantee to act [on] the grant upon the ground that ... the grant was void and
could not be acted upon.
H. FARNHAM, THE LAW OF WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 170 (1904).
22. 6 N.J.L. 1, 11-12 (1821).
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navigation, fishing, fowling, sustenance, and all the other uses of
the waters and its products ...are common to all the citizens
23
In Priewe v. Wisconsin State Land and Improvement Co.,24 the Wis-
consin Supreme Court considered a statute authorizing drainage of a lake
"for the ostensible purpose of promoting the public health"25 and con-
veying the exposed lands to an authority empowered to lower the waters.
The court held that the act was void because "the state is powerless to
divest itself of its trusteeship as to the submerged lands under navigable
waters . . . [even] under the guise of promoting the public health. 26
The court further noted:
The legislature has no more authority to emancipate itself from the
obligation. . . it. . .assumed at the commencement of [Wiscon-
sin's] statehood, to preserve for the benefit of all the people...
the enjoyment of the navigable waters . . . than it has to donate
the school fund or the state capitol to a private purpose. . . .The
navigable waters of the state belong to the state. 27
Similarly, it was stated by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Arnold that
the state could, through its legislature, authorize innumerable uses of its
waters and waterways, but that it could not "make a direct and absolute
grant, divesting all the citizens of their common right."28
These precedents were recognized by the United States Supreme
Court in Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Illinois.29 In that case the
Illinois Legislature had purported to convey virtually the entire Chicago
waterfront to private parties. When the legislators later had a change of
heart and revoked their grant, the Court upheld the revocation on the
ground that the state's interest in the waterfront was inalienable.3" The
Court concluded that the title under which a state holds the beds of navi-
gable waters is a title "different in character from that which the State [or
the federal government] holds in. . .the public lands which are open to
preemption and sale."' 31 "It is a title," wrote Justice Field, "held in trust
for the people of the State that they may enjoy the navigation of the
waters, carry on commerce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein
23. Id. at 76-77.
24. 103 Wis. 537, 79 N.W. 780 (1899).
25. Id. at 539, 79 N.W. at 781.
26. Id. at 548-49, 79 N.W. at 781.
27. Id. at 549-50, 79 N.W. at 781-82.
28. 6 N.J.L. at 13. Such a grant, noted the court, would be contrary to the "principles of
[the state's] constitution." Id.
29. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
30. Id. at 452-56.
31. d. at 452.
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freed from the obstruction or interference of private parties. '3 2 While
the state may grant parcels of such beds for the purpose of improving or
furthering navigation and commerce, the abdication of:
[T]he general control of the State over lands under the navigable
waters of an entire harbor or bay, or of a sea or lake is not consis-
tent with the exercise of that trust. . . . The [state's control] for
[trust purposes] can never be lost, except as to such parcels as are
used in promoting the [public interest] or can be disposed of with-
out. . . substantial impairment of the public interest in the lands
and waters remaining. The state can no more abdicate its trust
over property in which the whole peo le are interested. . . than it
can abdicate its police powers ...
The California Supreme Court expressly applied the Illinois Central
doctrine for the first time in Forestier v. Johnson.34 The plaintiff had
purchased tidelands embracing "Fly's Bay," a navigable inlet opening
into San Francisco Bay, and sought to enjoin others from entering in
boats for the purpose of hunting and fishing. The court held that the
tidelands patent did not terminate the public uses of navigation and fish-
ery, but merely conveyed to the patentee title to the soil subject to the
public right."
The doctrine was again applied by the California Supreme Court in
People v. California Fish Co. 36 At issue was the effect of a patent under
grant statutes providing for the sale of swamp land, salt-marsh, and tide-
lands. The State argued the patent was invalid because the land in ques-
tion was sovereign land of the state, held in trust for public use.37 The
32. Id.
33. Id. See also Coxe V. State, 144 N.Y. 396, 406, 39 N.E. 400, 402 (1895), in which it
was stated:
While I am not aware of any.. . restriction [on alienation of lands under tidewaters]
to be found in the constitution of this state,. . . it must be deemed to be inherent in
the title and power of disposition. The title which the state holds, and the power of
disposition, is an incident and part of its sovereignty that cannot be surrendered,
alienated or delegated, except for some public purpose, or some reasonable use which
can fairly be said to be for the public benefit.
34. 164 Cal. 24, 127 P. 156 (1912).
35. Id. at 39, 127 P. at 162. The court relied in part on art. XV, § 2 (now art. X, § 4) of
the California Constitution, which provides:
No individual, partnership or corporation claiming or possessing the frontage or title
lands of a harbor, bay, inlet, estuary, or other navigable water in this state shall be
permitted to exclude the right of way to such water whenever it is required for any
public purpose, not to destroy or obstruct the free navigation of such water. ...
See also People v. California Fish, 166 Cal. 576, 588, 138 P. 79, 85 (1913), in which the court
stated that "[s]ince the adoption of [the California] Constitution in 1879, . . . grants of such
lands by the State carry, at most, only the title to the soil, subject to the public right of
navigation."
36. 166 Cal. 576, 138 P. 79 (1913).
37. Id. at 584, 138 P. at 82.
court held that any disposition of sovereign lands made by the state sub-
jects the grantee to the same terms upon which they were held by the
state. The court further noted that in the administration of the public
trust, the state may sell and dispose of lands free of the public easement
only "in order to implement a plan or system of improvement or devel-
opment for the promotion of navigation and commerce. 38
In terms reminiscent of the United States Supreme Court's charac-
terization of the facts in Illinois Central, the court pointed out that the
tidelands embraced in the California grant statutes included "the entire
sea beach from the Oregon Line to Mexico and the shores of every bay,
inlet, estuary, and navigable stream as far up as tide water goes. .. .
However, the California court simply construed the statutes as reserving
the public trust interest in the granted lands, thus avoiding the necessity
of deciding as the Illinois Central Court had, whether a purported grant
of such a magnitude was in itself revocable, if not void.4 The land thus
remained subject to the public rights of navigation and fishery.4"
The court went on to state:
If. . .it is found necessary or advisable [to isolate some tidelands]
so that they become unavailable for navigation, the state has power
to exclude such portions from the public use and to that extent
revoke the original dedication. [The land excluded from] naviga-
tion may become proprietary land, not subject to the public use,
and it may then be alienated irrevocably by the state for private
use. . 42
The court added, however, that a determination by the state to cut off
portions of tidelands from navigation and to authorize an abandonment
of the public use would be closely scrutinized to ascertain the true legisla-
tive intent.43 The purported abandonment would fail where the legisla-
tive intent was not "clearly expressed or necessarily implied."'
38. Id. at 584-85, 138 P. at 82.
39. Id. at 591, 138 P. at 85.
40. Id. at 591, 138 P. at 85. In the words of one commentator, the California tidelands
patent conveys at best a "naked fee" subject to the public right of navigation, fishery, recrea-
tion, and environmental preservation. Taylor, Patented Tidelands: A Naked Fee?, 47 CAL. ST.
B.J. 420, 421 (1972). Insofar as patents under the tideland laws embrace submerged lands,
"they convey no title whatever." California Fish, 166 Cal. at 601, 138 P. at 89.
41. California Fish, 166 Cal. at 584, 138 P. at 82.
42. Id. at 597, 138 P. at 88.
43. Id. This result is consistent with what one commentator has described as a reluctance
on the part of the courts to permit the disposition of public resources under circumstances that
may subordinate or reallocate broad public uses to private ones. See Sax, The Public Trust
Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. Rlv. 473, 562-
63 (1970).
44. California Fish, 166 Cal. at 597, 138 P. at 88.
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A. The Berkeley Waterfront Case: What Price Fill?
City of Berkeley v. Superior Court4 5 was the first of Justice Mosk's
public trust opinions. At issue in the case were the majority of the tide
and submerged lands constituting the Berkeley Waterfront. 4
As part of the nineteenth century policy of disposition, the Legisla-
ture had created the Board of Tide Land Commissioners, which was au-
thorized to survey and dispose of "certain salt marsh and tidelands
belonging to the State of California."' 7 Within the ambit of this broad
grant of authority were the tide and submerged lands of San Francisco
Bay. The state and the City of Berkeley argued that private grants of the
Berkeley waterfront lands obtained from the Board were invalid, or at
most, conveyed a fee subject to the public trust for commerce and naviga-
tion.4 8 Initially, the applicability of Illinois Central and California Fish
seemed logically inescapable. However, the Berkeley grants had previ-
ously been approved by the California Supreme Court in Knudson v.
Kearney,4 9 in which the court had held that the statutes authorizing the
Board to dispose of the tide and submerged lands were enacted as an aid
to navigation and to improve San Francisco Bay.5" Moreover, the court
in Knudson held that some of the tracts granted by the Board had al-
ready been filled and were no longer of direct value to the people under
the public trust.5 1
Relying on Knudson, the trial court found that the tide and sub-
merged lands were conveyed free of the public trust, and that the state
was estopped to deny that the plaintiffs' property was free of the trust,
because the state had asserted the contrary position in a previous case.5 2
45. 26 Cal. 3d 515, 606 P.2d 362, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327 (1980).
46. Id. at 519-520, 606 P.2d at 364, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 329.
47. 1869-70 Cal. Stat. 541; 1867-68 Cal. Stat. 716. The San Francisco Bay became the
subject of vast subdivision under these acts, particularly during the late 1800's. By 1970, over
15,000 acres of bay bottom had been claimed by private parties under deeds issued by the
Board of Tide Land Commissioners. See Amicus Brief of San Francisco Bay Conservation
and Development Commission (BCDC) at 3. This acreage constituted 22% of the bottom of
the bay. See BCDC San Francisco Bay Plan 2 (1969). The surface area of the bay was re-
duced from 680 square miles in the 1800's to 430 square miles in 1970 because of filling. Id.
48. City of Berkeley, 26 Cal. 3d at 519-20, 606 P.2d at 364, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 329. The
acreage conveyed-over 22,000 acres-far exceeded the 1000 acres at issue in Illinois Central.
Id. at 526, 606 P.2d at 368, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 333.
49. 171 Cal. 250, 152 P. 541 (1915).
50. Id. at 252, 152 P. at 542.
51. Id. at 251-52, 152 P. at 541-42.
52. See Alameda Conservation Ass'n. v. City of Alameda, 264 Cal. App. 2d 284, 70 Cal.
Rptr. 264 (1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 906 (1969) (sustaining state's argument that convey-
ance of tidelands to private developers terminated the public trust).
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Thus, on appeal, the California Supreme Court was confronted with
competing precedents: on the one hand were Illinois Central and Califor-
nia Fish; on the other was the express holding in Knudson that the tide-
lands were conveyed free of any public trust.
Writing for the majority, Justice Mosk first disposed of the estoppel
argument, noting that the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply
to bar litigation of issues of "great public importance."53 He then ex-
pressly overruled Knudson, and held that the Berkeley tidelands re-
mained subject to the public trust despite the absolute form of the
grants.5 4
In Justice Mosk's view, the conveyances under the 1870 statute did
not meet the requirements of Illinois Central and California Fish. Thus,
Knudson was wrongly decided. 5 The Act allowed the Board to grant
"the entire waterfront of every community along a substantial portion of
the bay to private persons in fee, without reference to whether or not a
harbor would be desirable or possible at any particular point."56 The
statute made no reference to any specific public improvement to promote
navigation. Its evident purpose was not to improve navigation or com-
merce but, instead, to raise revenue for the state.57
As further support for his decision, Mosk noted that the California
Attorney General-at the time of the passage of the original Act-had
advised that the purchasers of tidelands would take subject to an ease-
ment for commerce and navigation. Mosk cited a provision of the Cali-
fornia Constitution prohibiting both the sale of tidelands within two
miles of an incorporated city and the obstruction of free navigation of
navigable waters. 9 He also emphasized the "checkered history" of Cali-
fornia's trusteeship.' He noted that the series of acts and constitutional
amendments passed during the 1860's and 1870's were in reaction to
such prior governmental abuses as fraudulent transfers of tidelands to
53. 26 Cal. 3d at 520 n.5, 606 P.2d at 364 n.5, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 329 n.5.
54. Id. at 521, 606 P.2d at 369, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 334.
55. Id. at 531-32, 606 P.2d at 371-72, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 336-37.
56. Id. at 529, 606 P.2d at 370, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 335.
57. Id. at 530, 606 P.2d at 370, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 335.
58. Id. at 529, 606 P.2d at 370, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 335.
59. CAL. CONST. art. X, §§ 3-4. During the debates concerning the adoption of this pro-
vision at the Constitutional Convention of 1879, it was observed that in the preceding 25 years,
California's liberal land grant policy had nearly resulted in "the monopolizing of every front-
age upon navigable waters in [the] state. . . by private individuals." Debates and Proceed-
ings, Cal. Const. Convention 1878-79 (cited in City of Berkeley, 26 Cal. 3d at 523, 606 P.2d at
366, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 331).
60. 26 Cal. 3d at 522-23, 606 P.2d at 365-66, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 335.
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private interests.61
For Mosk, the "crucial question" in the case involved the retroactiv-
ity of the Berkeley decision.62 Adopting an equitable rationale, he de-
clined to hold either that all grants made under the 1870 Act should be
subject to the public trust or that the Berkeley decision should apply only
prospectively.63 The former alternative would have reduced the value of
investments that might have been made in reliance on the Knudson deci-
sion "without necessarily promoting the purposes of the trust." 4 But
because the grants at issue were over a century old, the latter alternative
would have rendered the Berkeley decision a mere "academic exercise."
6
Mosk harmonized the competing interests of the public and the
grantholders by ruling that the public trust remained only in property
"still physically adaptable for trust uses."' 66 Tidelands that had been ren-
dered "substantially valueless for [trust] purposes by being filled . . .
[would be] free of the trust to that extent." 67
Mosk's reasoning in Berkeley evidenced a pragmatic recognition of
the purpose of the public trust doctrine, yet gave appropriate considera-
tion to the reasonable expectations of those holding title to trust proper-
ties. He applied established public trust principles to protect the rights of
the public in a difficult factual and legal setting, and at the same time
protected the justifiable expectations of private landowners.
B. State of California v. Superior Court (Lyon): The Public Trust and
Nontidal Waters
In State of California v. Superior Court (Lyon),68 the California
Supreme Court considered the applicability of the public trust doctrine
to nontidal marshland waters adjoining Clear Lake, a navigable inland
lake with an area of about sixty-four square miles. The plaintiff, Lyon,
had purchased a 500 acre tract of marshland-one of the few remaining
wetland areas on the lake.69 A former owner had constructed a levee in
61. Id.
62. Id. at 533, 606 P.2d at 373, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 338.




67. Id. Mosk noted that "a number of cases hold or state that the reclamation of tide-
lands subject to the public trust does not, without more, terminate the trust, but [those] cases
did not involve the interest of landowners who had reclaimed tidelands in reliance upon deci-
sions that were subsequently overruled." Id. at 535 n.19, 606 P.2d at 374 n.19, 162 Cal. Rptr.
at 339 n.19 [citations omitted].
68. 29 Cal. 3d 210, 625 P.2d 239, 172 Cal. Rptr. 696 (1981).
69. Id. at 216, 625 P.2d at 241, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 698.
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an effort to reclaim the marshlands. The levee had been mysteriously
breached, however, and never repaired. When Lyon sought a permit to
repair the levee, his request was denied on the ground that the state
claimed ownership of the portion of the marsh extending below the lake's
high water mark.70 Lyon sued to quiet title, relying on a California stat-
ute which provided that a purchaser of land bordering on a navigable,
nontidal lake or stream "takes to the edge of the lake or stream at the low
water mark."71
The United States Supreme Court had made clear in Shively v.
Bowlby 72 that the ownership of riparian lands between high and low
water was to be determined under state law.73 Superficially, California
Civil Code section 830 appeared to embody a low water rule. Lyon fur-
ther argued that California, by its adoption of the common law in 1850, 74
had embraced the English rule limiting title for purposes of navigation to
tidal waters."
The state argued, however, that section 830 conflicted with both the
doctrine of Illinois Central, which prohibits the wholesale alienation of
public trust lands, and the statutory construction rule of California Fish,
which requires a grant of sovereign lands to be construed-if at all possi-
ble-to retain the public trust.76 The state also pointed out that some
4,200 miles of shoreline along thirty-four navigable lakes and thirty-one
navigable rivers could be affected by the outcome in the case, and that
the marshlands at issue themselves constituted one-half of the remaining
marshland on Clear Lake.77
Writing for the majority, Justice Mosk first noted that the purported
English distinction 78 between tidal and nontidal waters had not been ap-
70. Id. at 215, 625 P.2d at 241, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 698.
71. CAL. CIv. CODE § 830 (West 1983).
72. 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
73. Id. at 216. See also Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 338 (1876). Twenty states have
adopted a low water boundary; ten have adopted a high water boundary. Of the remaining
states, a few allow private ownership to the middle of the water, while others have adopted
altogether different rules. See Lyon, 29 Cal. 3d at 216 n.4, 625 P.2d at 242 n.4, 172 Cal. Rptr.
at 699 n.4.
74. See 1850 Cal. Stat. 95.
75. 29 Cal. 3d at 216-17, 625 P.2d at 242-43, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 699-70. This distinction
did not actually exist in English law, but misinterpretation by some state courts led to its
adoption in several eastern states. See Deveney, Title, Jus Publicum, and the Public Trust: An
Historical Analysis, 1 SEA GRANT L.J. 13, 53-54 (1976).
76. 29 Cal. 3d at 231-32, 625 P.2d at 251-52, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 708-09.
77. Id. at 216, 625 P.2d at 242, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 699.
78. See Deveney, supra note 75.
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plied by most American courts.79 Indeed, the Illinois Central opinion
itself illustrated the rejection of the English rule.80 He then observed that
Civil Code section 830 for many years had been construed to create a low
water boundary on nontidal waters.81 Moreover, two states with similar
statutes had interpreted them as conveying title to the low water mark.82
Thus, a good argument could be made that Section 830 limited the state's
fee title to the low water mark.
Mosk nonetheless held that the lands between the low and high
water marks remained subject to the public trust.8 3 Any other conclu-
sion would have required the disapproval of California Fish and its prog-
eny.84 Moreover, if a statute authorizing the conveyance of sovereign
lands could "not be interpreted to abandon the public trust unless no
other interpretation [was] reasonably possible,"85 Civil Code section
830-which contained no words of conveyance-could hardly operate to
terminate the trust interest in the Clear Lake waters.
86
Mosk also noted that the Lyon holding would effect "less of an inter-
ference with property rights than occurred in Illinois Central, California
Fish and City of Berkeley. In those cases the landowners had received
outright grants from the state, purportedly in fee, while . . . [Lyon's]
title. . . is based only upon administrative interpretation of an ambigu-
ous statute."87 Finally, Mosk emphasized that Lyon could continue to
make use of the lands between the low and high water marks "in any
manner not incompatible with the public's interest in the property." 8
In the companion case of State v. Superior Court (Fogerty), 89 the
court addressed two additional issues-this time with respect to the
shoreline of Lake Tahoe. Plaintiffs argued that the state was estopped
from claiming an interest in lands above the low water mark because of
its long-standing recognition of the landowners' fee interest to that level.
Mosk wrote that the doctrine of estoppel should not apply if "the result
79. 29 Cal. 3d at 219, 625 P.2d at 244, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 701. See also McManus v.
Carmichael, 3 Iowa 1, 27 (1856); Cates v. Wadlington, 12 S.C.L. (1 McCord) 580, 582 (1822);
Carson v. Blazer, 2 Binn. 475, 484-86 (Pa. 1810).
80. The Illinois Central Court applied the public trust doctrine to Lake Michigan-a non-
tidal body of water. See Illinois Central, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
81. 29 Cal. 3d at 221, 625 P.2d at 245, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 702.
82. Id. See also Herrin v. Southerland, 74 Mont. 587, 595, 241 P. 328, 331 (1925).
83. 29 Cal. 3d at 229, 625 P.2d at 250, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 708.
84. Id. at 231, 625 P.2d at 251, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 708.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 222, 625 P.2d at 246, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 703.
87. Id. at 232, 625 P.2d at 252, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 709.
88. Id.
89. 29 Cal. 3d 240, 625 P.2d 256, 172 Cal. Rptr. 696 (1981).
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would be to nullify a strong rule of policy adopted for the benefit of the
public."9 He reiterated the importance of the public values at stake:
The shorezone is a fragile and complex resource. It provides
the environment necessary for the survival of numerous types of
fish,. . . birds .. . and many other species of wildlife and plants.
These areas are ideally suited for scientific study, since they pro-
vide a gene pool for the preservation of biological diversity. In
addition, the shorezone in its natural condition is essential to the
maintenance of good water quality, and the vegetation acts as a
buffer against floods and erosion. 9'
In Mosk's view, public policy commanded rejection of estoppel and
application of the public trust: "The exercise of the police power has
proved insufficient to protect the shorezone. The urgent need to prevent
deterioration and disappearance of this fragile resource provides ample
justification for our conclusion that the People may not be estopped from
asserting the rights of the public in those lands." 92
Mosk then turned to the complex issue of determining the proper
boundary between public and private use: should the line be drawn at
the "natural" level of the lake before it was dammed in 1870? Here Jus-
tice Mosk showed the same pragmatism that characterized his opinion in
City of Berkeley.93 The difficulty of reconstructing the natural water
level of the lake-or that of hundreds of lakes and streams dammed in
California since the early days of statehood-provided "a convincing jus-
tification for accepting the current level of the lake as the appropriate
standard." 94 He noted that the Lake Tahoe dam had been in existence
"long past the period required for the acquisition of prescriptive
rights."9' The public arguably had acquired, therefore, a prescriptive
right for public trust purposes in the lands lying between the natural and
artificial low water points.96 Finally, Justice Mosk cited-by way of anal-
ogy-cases holding that a landowner may enforce the maintenance of a
long-continued artificial condition when there have been substantial ex-
penditures made in reliance upon the condition.97
90. Id. at 244, 625 P.2d at 259, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 716.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 247, 625 P.2d at 260, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 717.
93. See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
94. 29 Cal. 3d at 248, 625 P.2d at 261, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
95. Id. See also State ex rel O'Connor v. Sorenson, 222 Iowa 1248, 1256, 271 N.W. 234,
238-39 (1937); State ex rel. Thompson v. Parker, 132 Ark. 316, 322, 200 S.W. 1014, 1016
(1918).
96. 29 Cal. 3d at 248, 625 P.2d at 261, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
97. Id. at 249 n.5, 625 P.2d at 261 n.5, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 718 n.5. See also Natural Soda
Products Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 23 Cal. 2d 193, 197, 143 P.2d 12, 15 (1943); Chowchilla
Farms, Inc. v. Martin, 219 Cal. 1, 18, 25 P.2d 435, 441 (1933).
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Both the Lyon and Fogerty opinions exemplify the extension of pub-
lic trust protection beyond its primary nineteenth century rationale-
protection of the public uses of navigation, commerce, and fishery98-- to
other public uses. As the New Jersey Supreme Court has stated:
[T]he public rights in tidal lands are not limited to the ancient pre-
rogatives of navigation and fishing, but extend as well to recrea-
tional uses, including bathing, swimming and other shore
activities. The public trust doctrine, like all common law princi-
ples, should not be considered fixed or static, but should be molded
and extended to meet changing conditions and needs of the public
it was created to benefit. 99
That Justice Mosk shares this philosophy of the public trust doc-
trine is illustrated by his thoughtful opinions. In Lyon, he indicated that
the scope of the public's right in both tidal and nontidal waters extends
to "recreational uses and the right to preserve the tidelands in their natu-
ral state.' '"" ° The California Supreme Court had previously recognized
the broadened scope of the public trust doctrine with respect to tidal
waters. 101 In an opinion in which Mosk joined, the court had stated:
In administering the [public] trust the state is not burdened with
an outmoded classification favoring one mode of utilization over
another . . . .There is a growing public recognition that one of
the most important public uses of the tidelands-a use encom-
passed within the tidelands trust-is the preservation of those
lands in their natural state, so that they may serve as ecological
units for scientific study, as open space, and as environments which
provide food and habitat for birds and marine life, and which fa-
vorably affect the scenery and climate of the area. 0
98. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11 (1894); California Fish, 166 Cal. at 584-85, 138
P. at 82-83. For a discussion of the development and rationale of the public trust doctrine see
National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Ct., 33 Cal. 3d 419, 433-40, 658 P.2d 709, 718-23, 189
Cal. Rptr. 346, 346-55, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983). In the nineteenth century, it was
important that waters susceptible of public commerce be considered public waters because of
their significance to the economic health of the growing nation. As Chief Justice Taney pointed
out in Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842):
[T]he men who first formed the English settlements could not have been expected to
encounter the many hardships [of] the new world, and to people the banks of its bays
and rivers if the land under the water at their very doors [had been] liable to immedi-
ate appropriation. . . as private property; and the settler upon the. . . land thereby
excluded from its enjoyment. . . without becoming a trespasser upon the rights of
another.
Id. at 414.
99. Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-By-The-Sea, 61 N.J. 296, 309, 294
A.2d 47, 54 (1972).
100. 29 Cal. 3d at 230, 625 P.2d at 251, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 707.
101. Id. at 230, 625 P.2d at 251, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 708.
102. Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 259-60, 491 P.2d 374, 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790, 796
(1971).
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Justice Mosk emphasized in Lyon that the common law distinction
between tidal and nontidal waters had been "thoroughly discredited"
and concluded that the scope of the public's rights in nontidal waters
should be as broad as it is in tidal waters. 103 Finally, he made clear "that
the public's interest is not confined to the water, but extends also to the
bed of the water."" ° Thus, Lyon, through the public trust, protects the
"shorezone" between low and high water marks on California's naviga-
ble nontidal waters.
1 0 5
C. City of Los Angeles v. Venice Peninsula Properties: California Finds
Its Roots Until the U.S. Supreme Court Intervenes
The fourth Mosk opinion discussed here dealt with perhaps the
most difficult issue: the applicability of the public trust doctrine to tide-
lands and uplands acquired in rancho grants from the Mexican govern-
ment prior to California's statehood. In City of Los Angeles v. Venice
Peninsula Properties,106 the city argued that a public trust applied to Bal-
lona Lagoon-an arm of the Pacific Ocean in the Marina Del Rey region
of Los Angeles. The city brought a quiet title action in the lagoon to
clear the legal obstacles to city plans to dredge it, construct sea walls, and
make other improvements. The city alleged that by virtue of the public
trust, the public owned an easement in the lagoon for commerce, fishing,
navigation, and other public purposes.
10 7
The lagoon tidelands had never been held in fee by either the State
of California or the federal government.108 The Mexican government
had conveyed the tidelands to private owners prior to cession of Califor-
nia to the United States. The federal government later patented the
grants pursuant to the Treaty of Guadalupe Hildalgo.109 Venice thus dif-
fered from City of Berkeley, Lyon, and Fogerty, in which the property
"was originally owned in fee by the state or federal govenment and [later]
granted. . . to private persons." 110
The city established through expert testimony that the lagoon was
subject to a civil law public trust under Mexican law when it became a
103. 29 Cal. 3d at 230-31, 625 P.2d at 251, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 108.
104. Id.
105. The doctrine apparently would not apply, however, to bodies of water that did not
exist at the time of California's admission to statehood, nor to waters that exist entirely on the
property of a private landowner.
106. 31 Cal. 3d 288, 644 P.2d 792, 182 Cal. Rptr. 599 (1982), rev'd sub nom. Summa Corp.
v. California ex rel. State Lands Comm'n, 466 U.S. 198 (1984).
107. Id. at 292, 644 P.2d at 794, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 601.
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rancho in 1839.111 The fee owners argued, however, that when the fed-
eral government patented title under the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, a
trust interest was not reserved. The public trust had been, in effect,
"laundered out."112
Speaking through Justice Mosk, the California court held that the
United States acquired the interest of the Mexican government in these
lands when it acquired California." 3 When California became a state,
the public trust interest in the rancho tidelands passed to the state as an
incident of sovereignty.' 1 4 Any other result, Mosk pointed out, would
have created a "California Mason-Dixon coastline":"15  the south-
largely former Mexican ranchos-would be free of the trust, while the
north coast would remain subject to the common law public trust
doctrine." 16
Unfortunately, this result was only briefly forestalled. The United
States Supreme Court reversed Venice Peninsula Properties on the
ground that the federal patent process had extinguished all prior rights,
including the Mexican trust.' 17
II. The Changing Concepts of Navigability and Title
Justice Mosk's public trust opinions have provided a foundation for
further developments of public trust law. In the recent case of National
Audubon Society v. Superior Court (Los Angeles Department of Water &
Power),"8 the California Supreme Court harmonized the apparent con-
flict between the trust doctrine and appropriative water rights. Los An-
geles had diverted nonnavigable tributaries feeding Mono Lake,
California's second largest lake. As a result, the lake had dramatically
decreased in size." 9 The court held that appropriative water rights are
111. Id. at 297, 644 P.2d at 797, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 604. Since the drafting of Las Siete
Partidas in 1265, the law of Spain, and later Mexico, had reflected the law of Justinian, which
provided that the sea and its shores--extending to the mark reached by the highest winter
waves-were incapable of private ownership. Se R. SANDARS, THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTIN-
IAN, 2.1.3 (4th Ed. 1867).
112. 31 Cal. 3d at 299, 644 P.2d at 798, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 608.
113. Id. at 298, 644 P.2d at 792, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 599.
114. Id. at 302, 644 P.2d at 801, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 608.
115. 31 Cal. 3d at 302-303, 644 P.2d at 801, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 608.
116. Id.
117. Summa Corp. v. California ex rel. State Lands Comm'n, 466 U.S. 198 (1984). Con-
gress had provided for review of Mexican land claims by the Board of Land Commissioners.
Act of March 3,1851, §e, ch. 41, 9 Stat. 631, 632. The Supreme Court held in Summa that any
interests of the State of California in rancho lands patented by the Board were extinguished by
the state's failure to assert them in the Board's proceedings. Id. at 200.
118. 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
119. Id. at 424, 658 P.2d at 711, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
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impliedly conditioned by the public trust, and the state as trustee has
continuing supervisory authority."' 0 It also held that the public trust
doctrine protects navigable waters from any harm that would result from
the diversion of their nonnavigable tributaries.'21
This result hints at one remaining puzzle not yet resolved: the
changing concept of navigability. Whether waters must be "navigable"
under the federal test for title in order for the public trust to attach is not
at all clear. The beds of navigable waters belong to the states as an inher-
ent attribute of their sovereignty.' Under the traditional "title" test,
"navigable" waters are only those waters that in their natural condition
could have been used for trade or commerce at the time of the state's
admission to the union.123 In determining their boundaries, federal law
applies because the states acquire their sovereign lands, to which the
trust doctrine applies, through the Federal Constitution.124
As National Audubon illustrates, however, state concepts of naviga-
bility have become increasingly important. National Audubon extended
public trust protection to nonnavigable tributaries of a navigable lake. 125
In so doing, the opinion cited a number of cases in which a contemporary
definition of navigability was applied for purposes of defining public
rights of passage. 126 Other states have also relied on similar definitions to
vindicate public trust rights. In Day v. Armstrong,'27 for example, the
court held that if a stream could be navigated by small recreational craft,
the stream was navigable.'28 In Nekoosa-Edwards Paper Co. v. Railroad
Commission,129 the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated:
Many of the meandering lakes and streams of this state. . . have
ceased to be navigable for pecuniary gain. They are still navigable
in law; that is, subject to the use of the public for all the incidents
of navigable waters. As population increases, these waters are used
by the people for sailing, rowing, canoeing, bathing, fishing, hunt-
120. Id. at 445, 658 P.2d at 727, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
121. Id. at 437, 658 P.2d at 721, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
122. United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935).
123. See, eg., United States v. Utah, 238 U.S. 64, 76 (1931); Bohn v. Albertson, 107 Cal.
App. 738, 742, 238 P.2d 128, 131-32 (1951).
124. See Oregon ex rel State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 376
(1977); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894).
125. 33 Cal. 3d at 437, 658 P.2d at 721, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
126. Id. at 435-37, 658 P.2d at 720-21, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 356. The court cited inter alia,
People v. Russ, 132 Cal. 102, 64 P. 111 (1901); Gold Run D. & M. Co., 66 Cal. 138,4 P. 1152
(1888).
127. 362 P.2d 137 (Wyo. 1961). Accord, Luscher v. Reynolds, 153 Or. 625, 634-35, 56
P.2d 1158, 1162 (1936).
128. 362 P.2d at 195-96.
129. 201 Wise. 40, 228 N.W. 144 (1929).
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ing, skating and other public purposes.130
However, the courts have placed limits on the expansion of public
trust protection. In San Diego County Archaeological Society, Inc. v.
Compadres,'3' the California Court of Appeal rejected an attempt to im-
pose a trust upon twenty acres of dry land purportedly containing a "sig-
nificant and rare archaeological site."' 32 Although the Lyon, Fogerty,
and Venice opinions evince a willingness to interpret liberally the public
trust doctrine consistent with its purposes, Compadres demonstrates an
unwillingness on the part of at least one California court to apply it to
dry land.
Another question for the courts to resolve is whether the trust can
be applied to property in which the government has never held title. In
Venice Peninsula Properties, Justice Mosk expresssly disapproved dictum
in the Compadres opinion "that the public trust doctrine applies only to
property to which the state has at one time held title."' 133 Mosk's state-
ment remains highly significant, despite the reversal of Venice Peninsula
Properties by the United States Supreme Court.
The subsequent imposition of the trust on nonnavigable tributary
waters in National Audubon demonstrates that the public trust doctrine
is still very much alive in California. The opinion also hints that previ-
ous state ownership is no prerequisite to application of the trust: "the
power of the state as administrator of the public trust. . . extends...
to the enforcement of the trust against lands long thought free of the
trust.'
13 4
Recently, the Supreme Court of Montana ruled in accordance with
the Fogerty and Lyon decisions and upheld the right of the public to use
the waters and bed of the Dearborn River up to its high water mark.135
The court applied the public trust doctrine without regard for title to the
bed.136 In the court's view, the essential question was "whether the wa-
ters owned by the state under the constitution [are] susceptible to recrea-
tional use by the public."' 37 The court stated:
130. Id. at 47, 228 N.W. at 147. The Minnesota Supreme Court put it another way:
"[N]avigable waters in contrast with nonnavigable waters is but one way of expressing the idea
of public waters, in contrast with private waters." State v. Korrer, 127 Minn. 60, 62, 148
N.W. 617, 618 (1914).
131. 81 Cal. App. 3d 923, 146 Cal. Rptr. 786 (1978).
132. Id. at 925, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 787.
133. 31 Cal. 3d at 299 n.11, 644 P.2d at 798 n.11, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 605 n.11.
134. 33 Cal. 3d at 440, 658 P.2d at 723, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
135. Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163 (Mont. 1984).
136. Id. at 171.
137. Id. at 170.
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The capability of use of the waters for recreational purposes deter-
mines their availability for recreational use by the public.
Streambed ownership by a private party is irrelevant. If the waters
are owned by the state and held in trust for the people by the state,
no private party may bar the use of those waters by the people.
The Constitution and the public trust doctrine do not permit a pri-
vate party to interfere with the public's right to recreational use of
the surface of the State's waters.
138
This opinion evidences the steady erosion of the mechanistic view of
the public trust-as an easement retained in granted bottom lands-in
favor of a more rational "public use" test, which focuses on the public
benefits accruing from the application of the trust. One criterion often
used to evaluate the "public use" benefit is whether the body of water is
navigable by small recreational craft. In People ex rel. Baker v. Mack,'
39
the court characterized the test as whether the waters "are capable of
being navigated by oar or motor-propelled small craft."'" Several other
courts have suggested that the public trust attaches to streams without
attempting to examine their navigability in the title sense, relying on
their useability for pleasure boating.' A few courts-including the
California Supreme Court-have applied the doctrine to protect public
trust values even though its application cannot be justified by reference to
either navigability (in the traditional nineteenth century sense) or title. 42
One of the principal problems in removing the public trust from its
roots in fee ownership of the beds of navigable waters is the possibility
138. Id.
139. 19 Cal. App. 3d 1040, 97 Cal. Rptr. 448 (1971).
140. Id. at 1040, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 454. See also Frank, Forever Free: Navigability, Inland
Waterways, and the Expanding Public Interest, 16 U.C.D. L. REv. 579 (1983).
141. See, eg., Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 156 Wis. 261, 145 N.W. 816 (1914) (hold-
ing that a hunter had a right to navigate his boat into a grove of vegetation navigable during
annual periods of flooding).
142. For example, a New Jersey court has reasoned that the public trust authorizes a pub-
lic right of access to and use of dry sand areas beyond the tidal zone of municipal and quasi-
municipal property. Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 95 N.J. 306, 471 A.2d 355
(1984). In Wisconsin the doctrine has been cited to justify the imposition of development
restrictions on land within 1,000 feet of a navigable lake or within 300 feet of a navigable river.
Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 17, 201 N.W.2d 761, 768 (1972). The Just court
emphasized that Wisconsin's "active public trust duty... requires the state not only to pro-
mote navigation but also to protect and preserve [the] waters for fishing, recreation and scenic
beauty." Id. And as previously discussed, the California Supreme Court, in theAudubon case,
found protection in the public trust for navigable waters threatened with destruction by the
diversion of their nonnavigable tributaries. Audubon, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal.
Rptr. 346, cert denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983). Finally, the North Dakota Supreme Court has
held that the public trust imposes a duty on the state to plan comprehensively for the use of its
water resources. United Plainsmen Ass'n v. State Water Conservation Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d
457, 460 (N.D. 1976).
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that the trust rights will recede along with the waters. 143 Under tradi-
tional public trust theory, the trust remains attached to the beds, even
when the waters have been drained or filled. 1" There is a certain reas-
suring logic to hold that the trust survives as a retained vestige of the
state's prior fee ownership, like the smile of a jurisprudential cheshire
cat.
But predicating public rights to waters on bottom ownership raises
other paradoxes. For example, although the Wisconsin courts have long
upheld the right of the public to use the state's navigable streams and
lakes for fishing, hunting, and boating, 145 Wisconsin property law gives
title to the bed of a navigable stream to the riparian owner.146 However,
the state holds title to the bed of a navigable lake.147 These distinctions
may lead to seemingly irrational differences in the treatment of public
rights to use these waters. For instance, courts have differed as to
whether anglers may merely pass through water in a boat or also have
the right to walk in wading boots on the submerged bed.148 Thus, Wis-
consin's inconsistent approaches could lead, hypothetically, to the result
that one can fly cast or angle in Wisconsin's lakes, but not in Wisconsin's
rivers or streams, precisely the opposite of the angler's dream.
Evolving definitions of navigablility have expanded public rights to
use waters for recreation. Recreational and environmental uses now pro-
tected by the trust clearly go far beyond the commercial navigation that
was its nineteenth century rationale. These two juridical streams, still
theoretically separate, seem ready to converge.
143. See Lamprey v. Metcalf, 52 Minn. 181, 53 N.W. 1139 (1893), stating that when waters
"have so far receded or dried up as to be no longer capable of any beneficial use by the public,
they are no longer public waters[,] and their former beds. . . become the private property of
the riparian owners."
144. See, e.g., Atwood v. Hammond, 4 Cal. 2d 31, 42, 48 P.2d 20, 25 (1935). This tradi-
tional theory has been qualified by the courts, however, in two respects. First, in Bohn v.
Albertson, 107 Cal. App. 2d 738, 238 P.2d 128 (1951), the California Court of Appeal held
that the owner of the underlying bed had the right to reclaim his land after the receeding of
flooding caused by avulsion. In Wilbour v. Gallagher, 77 Wash. 2d 306, 426 P.2d 232 (1969),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 87 (1970), the Washington Supreme Court held that littoral owners had
no right to fill their land.
145. See, eg., Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 156 Wis. 261, 145 N.W. 816 (1914).
146. Id.
147. Baker v. Voss, 217 Wis. 415, 259 N.W. 413 (1935).
148. The Wyoming Supreme Court, for example, has held that where waters are owned by
the state but the beds are owned by private landowners, the public is allowed to float boats or
other craft, but is forbidden to wade in the water. Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 146 (Wyo.
1961). However, the Michigan Supreme Court dismissed a riparian landowner's trespass suit
against a fisherman. The court affirmed the landowner's title to the streambed, but held that
the title was subject to a public trust, which conferred on the public the legal right to wade in
the stream for fishing. Collins v. Gerhardt, 237 Mich. 38, 211 N.W. 115 (1926).
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Conclusion
A vigorous common law public trust doctrine is much needed in an
era of waning conservation efforts at the federal level. 149 Federal trustee-
ship, so easily abrogated by implied congressional repeal, is a fragile reed
on which to base environmental preservation.
Thanks in no small part to Justice Stanley Mosk, the people of the
State of California may enjoy their incomparable coastline, lakes, and
rivers with reasonable assurance against encroachment. Between high
and low water on California's navigable lakes and rivers, the people have
the right to fish, to enjoy nature, to beach their craft, and to hike and
picnic.
In City of Berkeley, Fogerty, Lyon, and Venice Peninsula, Justice
Mosk has made notable contributions to environmental law. These opin-
ions exemplify the development of the common law in its highest form:
drawing on history and established precedent, they resolve modem needs
in both a realistic and fair manner. By reasserting and extending the
ancient doctrine of the public trust, Stanley Mosk has singularly contrib-
uted to the preservation of our water resources. For this, we, and future
generations, owe him a debt of gratitude.
149. See, eg., Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 313 (1981) (quoting New Jersey v. New
York, 283 U.S. 336, 348 (1981), in which Justice Rehnquist pointed out that federal common
law is at best "subject to the paramount authority of Congress"). One federal court recently
found certain public trust rights to have been pre-empted by federal statutes. See Sierra Club
v. Andrus, 487 F. Supp. 443 (D.C. 1980), affid on other grounds sub nom. Sierra Club v. Watt,
659 F.2d 203 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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